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In this paper, we study the following question: For a public good economy where the provision
of public goods is to be ﬁnanced by property taxes collected from individuals, what is the optimal
feasible tax mechanism when a social planner is relatively uninformed of the properties of the
individuals? Using a Bayesian model, we provide the full characterization of the optimal feasible
tax mechanism with two agents and its properties. We ﬁnd that (i) when the expected total
endowment of the economy is relatively low enough or high enough, the incentive compatibility
constraint does not bind so that ﬁrst best taxation can be obtained; (ii) the second best feasible
tax mechanism requires a poor agent to pay relatively more than a rich agent, that is, it is
regressive; and (iii) the optimal feasible tax mechanism is increasing in the sense that the
agent’s tax payment increases with his endowment. For the case of more than two agents, under
certain mild assumptions we give some partial results similar to (i) and (ii) above. In addition,
we ﬁnd the optimal feasible tax mechanism for the corresponding inﬁnitely large economy.
Keywords: optimal taxation, feasibility, incentive compatibility, informational rent, second best
JEL classiﬁcation: H21, D71, D82
1 Introduction
This paper is motivated by a practical property or income taxation problem: For a public good
economy where the provision of public goods is to be ﬁnanced by property taxes collected from indi-
viduals, what is the optimal feasible tax mechanism when a social planner is relatively uninformed
of the properties of the individuals?1 In this case, the problem is that the social planner has to
take into account not only the individuals’ incentive to report their wealth truthfully, but also the
individual feasibility of the designed tax schedule in the sense that each individual’s tax payment
∗ I thank Professor Tomas Sj¨ ostr¨ om, my advisor, for his invaluable guidance and comments. I also thank
Professors Kalyan Chatterjee, Steven Huddart, James Jordan, and Neil Wallace for their helpful comments. Of
course, all remaining errors are mine. Contact Information: 608 Kern Graduate Building, University Park, PA 16802.
E-mail: brhee@psu.edu
1 Some authors use the term interim eﬃcient instead of optimal to emphasize the informational structure of their
model. In this paper, we choose optimal and use second best if necessary to distinguish such a situation where the
optimal tax mechanism is not ﬁrst best. Also, throughout the paper, we will use the terms wealth, endowment,
property or income of an agent interchangeably since they have the same meaning, the amount of resources the agent
has initially.
1should be consistent with their ability to pay. In particular, this kind of problem, optimal private
provision of public goods, is frequently observed in a small economy such as a club or village.2
Consider the following example. Two thieves, Ali and Baba, want to build a door for their treasure
cave. The quality of the door depends on the total contributions they make. Suppose that Ali is
relatively rich and has $200, and Baba is relatively poor and has $100, but that none of them knows
how much the other has. A social planner, who does not know how much Ali and Baba have, asks
them to report their wealth in order to determine their contributions (taxes). What is the optimal
feasible tax mechanism that maximizes the expected sum of utilities? If the social planner wants
to collect $300 for the door-building, she cannot impose $150 to each of the two thieves because it
is not (individually) feasible to Baba.
The theory of optimal taxation has a long history. Since the seminal work by Mirrlees [1971],
the optimal taxation literature has studied the incentive aspect of a tax mechanism and established
many characterization results under a variety of economic situations.3 Mirrlees [1971] considers
a labor income taxation problem for an inﬁnitely large economy and studies the optimality of
redistributive taxation when each individual has private information about his own productivity.
He shows that the redistributive tax mechanism is subject to suboptimality due to the informational
asymmetry between the public policy authority and the individuals. This situation is now well
understood as a second best taxation. Following Mirrlees [1971], many authors have analyzed a
trade-oﬀ between eﬃciency and equity of optimal income taxation. Other authors have studied
the optimal taxation problem from the implementation perspective (Guesnerie [1995] and Piketty
[1993] among others). However, most of these works have assumed that there is a continuum of
individuals and the tax schedule depends on an observable variable such as labor income so that
there are no individual feasibility or bankruptcy problems.
Implementation (or mechanism design) theory, pioneered by Hurwicz [1972] and Maskin [1999],
studies the implementability of various social choice rules and the characterization of the imple-
menting mechanisms under diﬀerent environments and informational assumptions.4 Most of results
in this literature, however, assume that the set of feasible outcomes is ﬁxed and common knowl-
edge so that this set does not depend on the realization of the economic environment. This is
a quite restrictive assumption, in particular, when agents have private information about their
own endowments or production technologies. If a social planner is relatively uninformed of the
realization of agents’ endowments, she has to consider the feasibility problem when designing an
implementing mechanism. The ﬁrst study to explicitly tackle this type of feasibility problem is
Hurwicz, Maskin and Postlewaite [1995].5 They considered the feasible implementation problem
under complete information in which a social planner does not know the realization of agents’ en-
dowments or production sets. Following them, there have been some extensions of their model to
incomplete information cases.6 However, those results have mainly focused on the implementability
2 Fund-rasing is another example of this problem. See, for example, Andreoni [1998].
3 For a survey of modern optimal taxation theory, see Stiglitz [1985].
4 For some recent surveys, see, e.g., Jackson [2000a, b], Palfrey [2002] and Maskin and Sj¨ ostr¨ om [2002].
5 The earlier version of this paper has been circulated since 1979.
6 See for example Hong [1996, 1998] and Tian [1999]. See also Dagan, Serreno, and Volij [1999], in which they study
the feasible implementation of a given taxation method which embodies the socially optimal tax level. However, their
work considers the taxation problem from the equity point of view so that the total amount of taxes to be collected is
exogenously given. In contrast, our model deals with the eﬃciency of a tax mechanism which endogenously determines
the each agent’s tax payment as well as the total amount of taxes.
2of a general social choice rule, but not on the eﬃciency of the implementing mechanism. Such an
eﬃciency problem has been a major subject in optimal taxation theory.
In this paper, we employ the so-called “endowment game” created by Hurwicz, Maskin and
Postlewaite [1995] to model the optimal feasible taxation problem of a public good economy with
a ﬁnite number of agents. That is, using a Bayesian model, we set up the maximization problem
of a utilitarian social planner who is relatively uninformed of the agents’ endowments. Since the
number of agents in the economy is ﬁnite, each agent’s tax payment will be aﬀected not only by
his own endowment not also by the others’ endowments.
We ﬁrst consider the case of two agents and two potential types, and fully characterize its
solution. Also, we can illustrate this solution graphically due to the low dimensionality of the
problem. The four main results of this paper are as follows. First, if the expected total endowment
of the economy is relatively low enough or high enough, then ﬁrst best feasible taxation can be
obtained. This result is due to the fact that the incentive compatibility constraint does not bind
at the corresponding ﬁrst best feasible tax schedules when the economy is relatively poor or rich.
Second, for the cases in which the incentive compatibility constraint does bind, the optimal feasible
tax mechanism imposes a high tax rate on a poor agent when his neighbor is rich. The intuition
behind this regressive taxation is that levying a tax on the poor agent does not cause an incentive
problem so that the social planner, who does not mind which agent pays how much proportion
of the total taxes, prefers to impose as much tax as possible on the poor agent rather than his
rich neighbor who may request an informational rent as a reward for the revelation of his type.
Third, the optimal feasible tax schedule is increasing in the sense that the tax payment of an
agent is increasing in his endowment. Fourth, we conduct a comparative statics analysis on how
the optimal feasible tax mechanism responds to a change in the initial parameter values. We ﬁrst
study the responses to a change in the probability distribution of endowment analytically, and then
to a change in endowment parameters by means of simulation. In essence, these analyses show how
each agent’s tax payment depends on the incentive compatibility constraint and the relative size of
low endowment.
As a natural extension, we consider the case of more than two agents. Although it is impossible
to fully describe the optimal feasible tax mechanism for this case due to its high dimensionality
and abundance of corner solutions, we obtain some partial results similar to those of the two-agent
case under certain mild assumptions. In addition, we ﬁnd the optimal feasible tax mechanism for
the corresponding inﬁnitely large economy, where the tax payment of an agent is always equal to
the amount of the low endowment.
Finally, we would like to mention the two features of our model that distinguish it from the
previous literature on public goods. Our model considers the continuous provision of public goods
under incomplete information. There is a huge literature on mechanism design and public economics
which analyzes public good economies. However, most of the models in this literature have dealt
with the discrete (in fact, binary) provision of public goods.7 Although this discreteness makes
the models mathematically simple and tractable,8 it is a restrictive assumption. In our model,
the provision of public goods is continuous because it is determined directly by the total amount
7 See, for example, D’Aspremont and G´ erard-Varet [1979], Laﬀont and Maskin [1979], and Gradstein [1994]. See
also Groves and Ledyard [1987].
8 One of many advantages that the discreteness assumption brings about is to make the individual utility depend
linearly on the provision of public goods.
3of taxes according to a constant returns to scale technology.9 Another feature of our model is
the direct linkage between taxes and level of provision of public goods. For standard models in
the implementation literature, for example D’Aspremont and G´ erard-Varet [1979] and Laﬀont and
Maskin [1979], there are little such a linkage, but mainly redistributive transfers among the agents,
which are used to resolve incentive problems. To this point, our model is closely related the theory
of private provision of public goods where collected taxes and level of provision of public goods are
explicitly related.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present the model for a
public good economy. In Section 3, we fully characterize the optimal feasible tax schedule for the
economy with two agents and two possible types. Using the characterization results, in Section 4,
we discuss the properties of the optimal mechanism and provide some comparative statics analyses.
As an extension, we consider the case of more than two agents in Section 5. In Section 6, we give
concluding remarks and future research agenda.
2 The Model
2.1 The Economy
Consider a public good economy with n agents, 2 ≦ n < ∞.10 Let N = {1,...,n} denote the set
of agents. There is one private good x ∈ R+ and one pure public good y ∈ R+, where the private
good can be used to produce the public good according to a constant returns to scale technology.
Without loss of generality, we normalize the production technology such that one unit of private
good can be transformed into one unit of public good. Each agent i ∈ N has the same quasilinear
von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function u on R2
+,
u(xi,y) = logy + xi,
where xi is the consumption of private good by agent i. Initially, each agent i is endowed with
private good ωi ∈ {ωL,ωH} only, where 0 ≦ ωL < ωH < ∞.11 Agent i is called poor when ωi = ωL
and rich when ωi = ωH. Let
Ω = {(ωL,ωH) ∈ R2
+ : ωL < ωH}
denote the set of all possible pairs of initial endowments.
The information structure of this economy follows a standard incomplete information (Bayesian)
model. The primitives of the economy are common knowledge, whereas each agent has private
information about his own endowment. That is, agent i knows the realization of his own endowment
ωi and the initial probability distribution of the other agents’ endowments, but does not know
9 Ledyard and Palfrey [1999] employ a model that allows continuous public goods provision. However, under their
assumptions of linear production and risk-neural preferences, it is equivalent to a discrete one. Also, Bergstrom,
Blume, and Varian [1986] study a continuous model, but their model assumes complete information.
10 The case where there is only one agent in the economy is trivial. The case where n = ∞ will be discussed in
Section 5.3.
11 In this paper, each agent’s initial endowment may be interpreted as a portion of his total wealth above the
subsistence level. Thus, it can be called the agent’s taxable wealth for the provision of public goods. This interpretation
will be made clear in Section 4.1.
4the realizations of the other agents’ endowments ω−i.12 Agents’ endowments are independently
distributed according to
Pr(ωi = ωL) = p ∈ (0,1) ∀ i ∈ N.
Thus, an economic environment is equivalent to the realization of ω = (ω1,...,ωn).
2.2 The Tax Mechanism
A tax mechanism consists of message spaces Mi for each agent i ∈ N, and an outcome func-
tion f which maps each message proﬁle m ∈ M ≡
 n
i=1 Mi into agents’ tax burdens t(m) =
(t1(m),...,tn(m)) ∈ Rn
+ and public good production y; f : m  → (t(m),y(m)). The constant
returns to scale technology implies that y(m) ≦
 n
i=1 ti(m) for all m ∈ M, but without loss of
generality, we can assume that the equality always holds since no taxes will be wasted.13 Hence,
we have the following simple deﬁnition.
Deﬁnition 2.1 (Tax Mechanism and Schedule) A tax mechanism Γ is deﬁned as Γ =  M,t ,
where t : M → Rn
+ is called a tax schedule.
Given a tax mechanism Γ =  M,t , let si : {ωL,ωH} → Mi denote the strategy (report) of
agent i. By the Revelation Principle (see Myerson [1979]), we are able to restrict our attention to a
direct incentive compatible tax mechanism. Thus, we assume that Mi = {ωL,ωH} for each i ∈ N.
The expected utility of agent i when his endowment is ωi and he reports si, assuming the other




























In this paper, we make two assumptions which a tax mechanism should satisfy. First, following
Hurwicz, Maskin, and Postlewaite [1995], we employ the no exaggeration assumption.
Assumption 2.2 (No Exaggeration) For each i ∈ N, si(ωi) ≦ ωi.
That is, no agent is allowed to overstate his endowment when reporting.14 This assumption partially
relieves the informational disadvantage of the social planner. Another assumption is the anonymity
of a tax mechanism: A tax schedule should not be aﬀected by the change of agents’ names.15 More
speciﬁcally, this includes two conditions. First, an agent’s tax payment should not be aﬀected by
12 Notational convention applies here, that is, given a vector a = (a1,...,an) ∈ A =
 n
i=1 Ai,
a−i = (a1,...,ai−1,ai+1,...,an) ∈ A−i =
 
j =i
Aj, and a = (ai,a−i).
13 This property may be viewed as a budget-balancedness. Compare with the Clarke-Groves mechanism where
budget-balancedness is usually not satisﬁed, see Clarke [1971] and Groves [1973].
14 It may be assumed that each agent is asked to put his report on the table.
15 This assumption must hold for every society where taxation is based on a democratic process.
5the change of order in the other agents’ reports as long as the distribution of their reports remains
the same. Second, any two agents’ tax payments should be the same if they report the same
endowment with other things being equal. Formally,
Assumption 2.3 (Anonymity) For all i,j ∈ N,
i. ti(si,s−i) = ti(si,σ(s−i)),
ii. si = sj =⇒ ti(si,s′) = tj(sj,s′) ∀ s′ ∈ {ωL,ωH}n−1,
where σ(s−i) is a permutation of s−i.
Under the anonymity assumption, let tL,(n−k)L,(k−1)H denote an agent’s tax payment when he and
(n − k) of the other agents report ωL and the remaining (k − 1) agents report ωH, k = 1,...,n.








Since we are considering a direct mechanism, we simply identify a (direct) tax mechanism Γ =  M,t 
with a tax schedule t in this paper.
To state the social planner’s problem, we need to look at three properties that a tax mechanism
should satisfy: Feasibility, Incentive Compatibility, and Individual Rationality. First, feasibility,
one of the most important concepts in this paper, implies that no tax mechanism should impose
more than the announced endowment.16 That is,
Deﬁnition 2.4 (Feasibility) A tax mechanism t is feasible if for all k = 1,...,n,
0 ≦ tL,(n−k)L,(k−1)H ≦ ωL and 0 ≦ tH,(n−k)L,(k−1)H ≦ ωH.
Throughout this paper, we require all tax mechanisms considered to be feasible. Second, by the
Revelation Principle, we consider an incentive compatible tax mechanism only.
Deﬁnition 2.5 (Incentive Compatibility: IC) A tax mechanism t is (Bayesian) incentive com-
patible if for all i ∈ N,
Ui(ωH|ωH,t) ≧ Ui(ωL|ωH,t). (1)
Note that due to the no exaggeration assumption, the incentive compatibility of a tax mechanism
for this economy is just one-directional; the inequality Ui(ωL|ωL,t) ≧ Ui(ωH|ωL,t) is meaningless.
Third, to make the agents participate in this public good economy, we need to make assumptions
as to what will happen if an agent does not participate. Notice that we have to distinguish between
the situations in which an agent does not want to report his endowment and in which an agent
wants to leave the economy or denies to pay the imposed tax. In the former case, we assume that
the social planner can impose a tax on the agent as if he were to report that his endowment is
ωL.17 Under this assumption, the expected utility of agent i who did not report is Ui(ωL|ωH,t)
if his endowment is ωH, or Ui(ωL|ωL,t) if his endowment is ωL. Since only incentive compatible
16 In this sense, the feasibility can also be called no-bankruptcy.
17 This kind of tax enforcement scheme seems well established in reality. Implicit or explicit membership fee in a
club is one of the examples.
6tax mechanisms are considered, agent i who reports his endowment will obtain Ui(ωH|ωH,t) if his
endowment is ωH, or Ui(ωL|ωL,t) if his endowment is ωL. Thus, by inequality (1), every agent will
report his endowment, which makes the individual rationality condition redundant in this model.
In the latter case, we assume that the social planner can prevent the agent from enjoying public
good by, for example, expulsion from the economy.18 Under this assumption, the expected utility
of the agent is u(xi,0) = −∞, ∀xi ∈ R+. Thus, the individual rationality constraint becomes
redundant, too. As a result, we can ignore individual rationality by the above two assumptions.
Finally, we add one more deﬁnition for a tax mechanism.
Deﬁnition 2.6 (Increasingness) A tax mechanism t is increasing if for all k = 1,...,n,
tL,(n−k)L,(k−1)H ≦ tH,(n−k)L,(k−1)H.
That is, a tax mechanism is increasing if an agent’s tax payment is increasing with his endowment.
2.3 The Social Planner’s Problem
The social planner (or tax authority) who does not know the true realization of the economic envi-
ronment, but knows the probability distribution, wants to ﬁnd an incentive compatible and feasible








which maximizes the expected sum











(IC) Ui(ωH|ωH,t) ≧ Ui(ωL|ωH,t) ∀ i ∈ N,
(Feasibility) t ∈ B(ωL,ωH) ≡ [0,ωL]n × [0,ωH]n.
























































0 ≦ tL,(n−k)L,(k−1)H ≦ ωL,
0 ≦ tH,(n−k)L,(k−1)H ≦ ωH,
∀ k = 1,...,n,







7Notice that only one (IC) constraint is binding. For notational simplicity, given p ∈ (0,1), deﬁne a
function ∆ : R2n
+ → R ≡ R ∪ {−∞,+∞} by
∆(t;p) = Ui(ωH|ωH,t) − Ui(ωL|ωH,t).
Then, a tax schedule t satisﬁes (IC) if ∆(t;p) ≧ 0.
3 Optimal Feasible Tax Mechanism for n = 2
In this section, we study the optimal feasible tax mechanism for the case of two agents. For n = 2,
a tax mechanism t can be written as
t = (tLL,tLH,tHL,tHH),
where, for example, tLH is the tax payment of an agent when he reports ωL and the other agent





= p2[2log(2tLL) − 2tLL] + 2p(1 − p)[2log(tLH + tHL) − (tLH + tHL)]
+ (1 − p)2[2log(2tHH) − 2tHH] + 2(pωL + (1 − p)ωH)
subject to
(IC)
p[log(tLH + tHL) − tHL] + (1 − p)[log(2tHH) − tHH]
≧ p[log(2tLL) − tLL] + (1 − p)[log(tLH + tHL) − tLH],
(Feasibility)
0 ≦ tLL ≦ ωL, 0 ≦ tLH ≦ ωL,
0 ≦ tHL ≦ ωH, 0 ≦ tHH ≦ ωH.













+ (tHH − tLH)
 
.
3.1 Possibility of First Best Taxation
To begin with, we examine the possibility of the ﬁrst best tax schedule which is the solution to
(P2) without (IC) constraint. If the social planner were to know the realization of each agent’s
endowment, she could easily ﬁnd the ﬁrst best tax schedule. However, she does not have such an
information, so the question is when the (IC) constraint is not binding. First of all, to rule out the
uninteresting cases, partition Ω (see Figure 1) into
Ω1 = {(ωL,ωH) ∈ Ω : ωL ∈ [0,1)}, and
Ω2 = {(ωL,ωH) ∈ Ω : ωL ∈ [1,∞)}.
When (ωL,ωH) ∈ Ω2, the social planner can easily solve (P2) by imposing a ﬁrst best feasible tax
schedule
t∗ ∈ {t ∈ B(ωL,ωH) : tLL = tHH = 1, tLH + tHL = 2, and 1 ≦ tLH ≦ ωL},
8since t∗ satisﬁes the (IC) constraint; ∆(t∗;p) = −(1 − t∗
LH) ≧ 0. If the social planner insists that
the tax schedule be increasing, then the unique solution to (P2) is t∗ = (1,1,1,1). Therefore, in
the following we just focus on the case of (ωL,ωH) ∈ Ω1. According to the welfare function W( ),











ωL,ωL,min{ωL + ωH,2} − ωL,min{ωH,1}
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Lemma 3.1 For (ωL,ωH) ∈ Ω1, ∆(tF;p) is strictly increasing in p.
Proof : Consider the two cases: (i) (ωL,ωH) ∈ [0,1) × (0,1], and (ii) (ωL,ωH) ∈ [0,1) × (1,∞].
































If ωL + ωH ≧ 2, then
∂∆(tF;p)
∂p
= ωL − logωL − 1 > 0.
Therefore, we have the result.














and let   ρ = min{1,ρ}. Deﬁne also
ΩF = {(ωL,ωH) ∈ Ω1 : lim
p→0
∆(tF;p) ≧ 0}.
20 In fact, there is a continuum of ﬁrst best feasible tax schedules if ωL + ωH > 2. However, given p, t
F is the
solution to (P2) while making (IC) satisﬁed maximally, so we can assume without loss of generality that t
F is the










Figure 1: Possibility of First Best Taxation
Proposition 3.2 If p ≧   ρ, then the ﬁrst best feasible tax schedule tF is the unique solution to (P2).
In particular, if (ωL,ωH) ∈ ΩF, then tF is the unique solution to (P2) for all p ∈ (0,1).
Proof : By the deﬁnition of   ρ and Lemma 3.1, if p ≧   ρ, then ∆(tF;p) ≧ 0, which implies that tF
satisﬁes (IC). Since tF is feasible, the fact that tF is the unique ﬁrst best feasible tax schedule
proves the ﬁrst result. It is obvious that limp→0 ∆(tF;p) ≧ 0 guarantees that ∆(tF;p) ≧ 0 for all
p ∈ (0,1).
Figure 1 depicts the possibility of ﬁrst best feasible taxation.
3.2 Second Best Tax Schedule
Assume that p <   ρ. To characterize the second best feasible tax schedule, we begin with three
lemmas. The main purpose of these lemmas is to lower the dimension of the social planner’s
problem.
Lemma 3.3 Suppose t∗ is a solution to (P2). Then,
t∗
HH = min{ωH,1}.
Proof : There are two cases: (i) ωH ≦ 1, and (ii) ωH > 1.
Case (i) ωH ≦ 1: Suppose by way of contradiction that t∗
HH < ωH. Choose ε such that 0 < ε ≦
ωH − t∗




HH + ε). Since log(2tHH) − tHH is
strictly increasing in tHH ∈ (0,1), it follows that
Ui(ωH|ωH,t′) > Ui(ωH|ωH,t∗) ≧ Ui(ωL|ωH,t∗) = Ui(ωL|ωH,t′).
Hence, t′ satisﬁes (IC). Also, t′ satisﬁes (Feasibility) by the construction of ε. However, we have
W(t′;p) > W(t∗;p), a contradiction to the hypothesis that t∗ is a solution.
Case (ii) ωH > 1: Suppose by way of contradiction that t∗
HH  = 1. If t∗
HH < 1, choose ε such that
0 < ε ≦ 1−t∗
HH. Then the same argument in Case (i) induces a contradiction. If t∗
HH > 1, choose
10ε such that 0 < ε ≦ t∗




HH − ε). Then,
the same argument in Case (i) also gives a contradiction.




Proof : Suppose by way of contradiction that t∗
LH + t∗
HL > 2. Note that this case is possible only




HL −ε) < ε
2. Such an ε is
well deﬁned since d
dy(logy) < 1








HL − ε) − t∗





























LL] + (1 − p)[log(t∗
LH + t∗
HL − ε) − t∗
LH]
= Ui(ωL|ωH,t′),















we have W(t′;p) > W(t∗;p), a contradiction to the hypothesis that t∗ is a solution.
Lemma 3.5 Suppose t∗ is a solution to (P2). Then,
t∗
LH = ωL, and t∗
HL ≧ ωL.
Proof : If ωL = 0, then the claim is trivial. Hence, consider the case of ωL > 0. Suppose by way of
contradiction that (i) t∗
HL < ωL; or (ii) t∗
LH < ωL and t∗
HL ≧ ωL.
Case (i) t∗
HL < ωL: Consider a new tax schedule t′ = (ωL,ωL,ωL,min{ωH,1}). Then,





− ωL + min{ωH,1}
 
> 0, (2)
which implies that t′ satisﬁes (IC). Also, t′ satisﬁes (Feasibility). However, we have W(t′;p) >
W(t∗;p), a contradiction to the hypothesis that t∗ is a solution.
Case (ii) t∗
LH < ωL and t∗
HL ≧ ωL: According to Lemma 3.4, we have two subcases: (a) t∗
LH+t∗
HL <














Ui(ωH|ωH,t′) = Ui(ωH|ωH,t∗) + pε
> Ui(ωL|ωH,t∗)
= Ui(ωL|ωH,t′) + (1 − p)ε
> Ui(ωL|ωH,t′),
(3)
11which implies that ∆(t′;p) > 0, that is, the (IC) constraint is not tightly binding. Since ∆(t;p)
is continuous in tHL, we can choose δ ∈ (0,ε) such that t′′ = t′ + (0,0,δ,0) still satisﬁes (IC) and











Hence, we have W(t′′;p) > W(t∗;p), a contradiction to the hypothesis that t∗ is a solution.
Subcase (b) t∗
LH+t∗
HL = 2: Notice that in this case ωH > 1 since t∗
HL = 2−t∗
LH > 2−ωL > 1. First,
we want to show that t∗
LL < ωL. Suppose not, that is, t∗
LL = ωL. Since t∗
HH = 1 by Lemma 3.3, it
turns out that
∆(t∗;p) = p(ωL − logωL − 1) − (1 − ωL) < 0,
since p <   ρ = 1−ωL
ωL−logωL−1. This is a contradiction to the hypothesis that t∗ satisﬁes (IC). So,
t∗
LL < ωL.




HH) where ε is chosen such that
0 < ε ≦ ωL − t∗
LH. Then, by (3), we have ∆(t′;p) > 0, that is, the (IC) constraint is not tightly
binding. Since ∆(t;p) is continuous in tLL and t∗
LL < ωL, we can choose δ ∈ (0,ωL−t∗
LL) such that





we have W(t′′;p) > W(t∗;p), a contradiction to the hypothesis that t∗ is a solution.
Therefore, we conclude that t∗
LH = ωL and t∗
HL ≧ ωL.
By Lemmas 3.3–3.5, we can reduce the dimension of (P2) from four to two. Let T = tLH +tHL.
Lemmas 3.3–3.5 implies that we can restrict our attention to (T,tLL) ∈ [2ωL,min{ωL + ωH,2}] ×
[0,ωL], which now can be called a tax schedule. Deﬁne (IC)-function z( , ;p) : [2ωL,min{ωL +

















+ (min{ωH,1} − ωL)
 
.
Thus, a tax schedule (T,tLL) satisﬁes (IC) if z(T,tLL;p) ≧ 0.
Now, the social planner’s problem (P2) can be written as an equivalent but simpliﬁed version
(P′






= p2[2log(2tLL) − 2tLL] + 2p(1 − p)[2logT − T]
subject to
(IC) z(T,tLL;p) ≧ 0
(Feasibility) (T,tLL) ∈ [2ωL,min{ωL + ωH,2}] × [0,ωL].
To ﬁnd the second best tax schedule, ﬁrst consider the shape of the (IC)-curve z(T,tLL;p) = 0.
In fact, we can ﬁnd a point that satisﬁes z(T,tLL;p) = 0 for all p ∈ (0,1). For (ωL,ωH) ∈ Ω \ ΩF,
let
  T = 2min{ωH,1}e−(min{ωH,1}−ωL), and







−   T + ωL
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so, it is clear that z(  T,  tLL;p) = 0 for all p ∈ (0,   ρ). That is, the (IC)-curve z(T,tLL;p) = 0 always
goes through the pivotal point (  T,  tLL). Furthermore,
Lemma 3.6 i. (  T,  tLL) ∈ (2ωL,min{ωL + ωH,2}) × [0,1).
ii. If   T ≦ 1, then   tLL > ωL.
Proof : i. Since log(min{ωH,1}) − min{ωH,1} > log(ωL) − ωL, it is clear that   T > 2ωL. For
(ωL,ωH) ∈ Ω1 \ ΩF, log
min{ωL+ωH,2}
2min{ωH,1} + (min{ωH,1} − ωL) = −limp→0 ∆(tF;p) > 0, so   T <
min{ωL + ωH,2}. To see that   tLL ∈ [0,1), by Lambert W function, it suﬃces to show that
ϕ(ωL,ωH) ≡ log
  T
2 −   T + ωL < −1. Note that since   T > 2ωL,
ϕ(ωL,ωH) = log(min{ωH,1}) − min{ωH,1} −   T + 2ωL
< log(min{ωH,1}) − min{ωH,1}
≦ − 1.
ii. Since 0 ≦   tLL < 1, the result is equivalent to   tLL−log  tLL ≦ ωL−logωL, or log
  T
2ωL −   T+2ωL ≧ 0.
By 2ωL <   T ≦ 1, we have the result.
This lemma tells that if   T ≦ 1, the pivotal point (  T,  tLL) is above the feasible set [2ωL,min{ωL +
ωH,2}] × [0,ωL]. Another property of the (IC)-curve is that it turns around the pivotal point
(  T,  tLL) counterclockwise as p increases.
Lemma 3.7 For all p,p′ ∈ (0,1) such that p < p′, if z(T,tLL;p) = 0, then
z(T,tLL;p′) =
 
< 0 if T <   T





























we have the result easily.
Figure 2 depicts the subsets of Ω that satisfy   tLL ≧ ωL and   T > 1.
21 The Lambert W function is deﬁned to be the function satisfying W(x)e
W(x) = x. This function is deﬁned on
[−e
−1,∞), and has a single real value on [0,∞) and two real values on [−e
−1,0). W0, called the principal branch,
is the increasing part of W and W−1, called the (−1)th branch, is the decreasing part of W. The solution of the
equation xb
x = a is x =
1
log bW(alogb). For more properties on the Lambert W function, see Corless, et. al. [1996].
(We reluctantly employ the notational abuse, W, previously used for the welfare function. Hopefully, it may not
cause any confusion in the following.)






  T > 1
log2
1   2   3  
.31 .44
Figure 2: Relative size of (  T,  tLL) on Ω
Now, consider the slope of (IC)-curve z(T,tLL;p) = 0. Without loss of generality, we can
restrict our attention to the domain of [0,2] × [0,1), which includes all of the possible (T,tLL).22
Using the Implicit Function Theorem,
dtLL
dT
   










     
     
z(T,tLL;p)=0
. (4)
Since we restrict tLL on [0,1), the denominator is negative. If p ≦ 1
2, then the numerator is negative
















. As a result, for (T,tLL) ∈ [0,2] × [0,1),
dtLL
dT

























Remark 3.8 According to the inequality (2), it turns out that for (ωL,ωH) ∈ Ω1, the curve deﬁned
by z(T,tLL;p) = 0 on (T,tLL) ∈ [2ωL,min{ωL + ωH,2}] × [0,ωL] has a negative slope because the
point (T,tLL) that has zero slope cannot be in [2ωL,min{ωL + ωH,2}] × [0,ωL].
The slope of welfare-curve   W(T,tLL;p) = w, where w is a constant, is
dtLL
dT
   












     
     
  W(T,tLL;p)=w
< 0, (5)
22 Note that z(T,tLL;p) = 0 deﬁnes multiple curves on R
2 while it deﬁnes a single curve on [0,2] × [0,1).
14for (T,tLL) ∈ [0,2] × [0,1). That is, the welfare-curve   W(T,tLL;p) = w has a negative slope on
[0,2] × [0,1).
To describe the second best feasible tax schedule, we need some deﬁnitions. First, for (ωL,ωH) ∈
Ω1 such that ωL +ωH ≦ 1 and p ∈ (0,   ρ), deﬁne tLL ∈ (0,ωL) by z(ωL +ωH,2,tLL;p) = 0. Second,
for p ∈ (0,   ρ), deﬁne T ∈ (2ωL,min{ωL + ωH,2}) by z(T,ωL;p) = 0. Third, deﬁne simply To = 1.
Finally, for   T < 1 and T < 1, deﬁne to
LL ∈ (0,ωL) by z(1,to
LL;p) = 0.23
Now, we can state the main result of this paper.





(tLL,ωL,ωH,ωH) if ωL + ωH ≦ To
(to
LL,ωL,To − ωL,min{ωH,1}) if T ≦ To
(ωL,ωL,T − ωL,min{ωH,1}) if T > To
.
Proof : Notice from (4) and (5) that the (IC)-curve z(T,tLL;p) = 0 is tangent to the welfare-curve
  W(T,tLL;p) = w at (T,tLL) = (To,to
LL).
For the interior solution (the third case), we need to show that the tangent point (To,to
LL) is
maximizing the welfare function   W( ) rather than minimizing. This can be done by showing that
d2tLL
dT2












Diﬀerentiating (4) and (5), it follows that
d2tLL
dT2
   






   
















    









For the corner solutions (the ﬁrs and second cases), we need to show that
T ≶ 1 =⇒
dtLL
dT
































≶ 0 for T ≶ 1,
respectively, since tLL ∈ [0,1). Therefore, we have t∗ as stated.
Table 1 summarize the optimal feasible tax schedules and their relative size for each possible case.




































































For T, W should be W−1 if p >
1








p ≧   ρ (including ΩF) ωL = ωL < min{ωL + ωH,2} − ωL ≧ min{ωH,1}
p <   ρ ωL + ωH ≦ 1 tLL ≦ ωL < ωH = ωH
ωL + ωH > 1 T ≦ 1 to
LL ≦ ωL < To − ωL < min{ωH,1}
T > 1 ωL = ωL < T − ωL   min{ωH,1}
Table 1: Optimal feasible tax schedules for n = 2.
3.3 Simulated Examples
In this section, we illustrate some examples that show the speciﬁc optimal feasible tax schedules
for diﬀerent parameter values. Due to the low dimensionality of the social planner’s problem, we
can draw the results graphically.
Example 3.10
i. Suppose ﬁrst that (ωL,ωH) = (0.2,0.5). In this case,   ρ ≈ −0.28, so p ≧   ρ for all p ∈ (0,1).





HH) = (0.2,0.2,0.5,0.5) is obtained.
ii. Suppose that (ωL,ωH) = (0.1,0.8). In this case,   ρ ≈ 0.13.




HH) = (0.1,0.1,0.8,0.8) is obtained. Fig-
ure 3(a) illustrates the case of p = 0.3.
(b) If p <   ρ, by Proposition 3.9, the second best tax schedule t∗ = (tLL,ωL,ωH,ωH) is obtained.






iii. Suppose that (ωL,ωH) = (0.25,0.8). In this case,   ρ ≈ 0.4.
(c) If p = 0.35 as illustrated in Figure 3(c), then T ≈ 1.02 > 1, so the second best tax schedule
t∗ = (ωL,ωL,T − ωL,ωH) = (0.25,0.25,0.77,0.8) is obtained.
(d) If p = 0.2 illustrated in Figure 3(d), then T ≈ 0.97 < 1, so the second best tax schedule
t∗ = (to
LL,ωL,To − ωL,ωH) = (0.21,0.25,0.75,0.8) is obtained.
iv. Figure 3(e)–(h) show some other cases that have the second best tax schedule for diﬀerent
parameter values.  
4 Properties and Comparative Statics
4.1 Properties of Optimal Feasible Tax Schedules
First, consider the possibility of ﬁrst best feasible taxation. For a ﬁrst best feasible tax schedule
to be a solution to the social planner’s problem, it should not give any incentive for an agent to











z( ) = 0   W( ) = w
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z( ) = 0
  W( ) = w
(h) (ωL,ωH) = (0.6,1.3), p = 0.5
Figure 3: An example of second best taxation
17this requirement says that a rich agent should have no incentive to lie. According to the character-
ization results in the previous section, when (i) p ≧   ρ, or (ii) (ωL,ωH) ∈ Ω2, the corresponding ﬁrst
best feasible tax schedules can be a solution to the social planner’s problem (P2). For the case of
(ii), the endowment of a poor agent is large enough that the ﬁrst best feasible tax schedule could
impose the same amount of tax on each agent for any case.24 Thus, a rich agent has no incentive to
misreport his type. On the other hand, for the case of (i), since the overall endowment level of the
economy is small enough (the case of ΩF) or the probability of low endowment is high enough, a
rich agent worries mainly about that too low amount of public good would be provided if he misre-
ports. Thus, he will not lie. Therefore, when the total endowment of the economy is relatively low
enough or high enough, ﬁrst best feasible taxation satisﬁes the incentive compatibility constraint
so that it can be the solution to (P2).
Second, the optimal feasible tax schedule always imposes 100% tax rate on a poor agent when
his neighbor is rich.25 That is, t∗
LH = ωL for all (ωL,ωH) ∈ Ω1 and all p ∈ (0,1). This result reﬂects
the eﬀect of informational rent on the economy which pursues eﬃciency rather than equity as its
objective. Due to the no exaggeration assumption, the incentive compatibility constraint in this
model is unilateral so that levying a tax on a poor agent does not create any incentive problem
as long as it is feasible. Thus, the social planner, who does not mind which agent pays how much
proportion of the total taxes, prefers to impose as much tax as possible on the poor agent rather
than his rich neighbor who may request informational rent. Of course, the absolute amount of tax
payment of rich agent is strictly higher than that of poor agent. However, since there do exist some
cases in which the tax rate imposed on the rich agent is strictly less than 100%, we can say that
the optimal feasible tax mechanism is regressive.
Third, the optimal feasible tax schedule is increasing.






Proof : The ﬁrst inequality is clear since Lemma 3.5 implies that t∗
LL ≦ ωL ≦ t∗
HL. The second
inequality is also clear since t∗
LH = ωL < min{ωH,1}.
Thus, under the optimal feasible tax mechanism each agent’s tax payment is increasing with his
endowment. Note, however, that this increasingness does not imply that marginal tax rate is
increasing.
Finally, we note the property that for all (ωL,ωH) ∈ Ω, t∗
LL ≦ t∗
LH with strict inequality for
some cases as can be seen in Table 1. That is, a poor agent may say, “If my neighbor is rich, then
I have to pay more!” This can be interpreted in a quite similar way used in the second property
above; a poor agent should take some extra burden caused by his rich neighbor, which would not
have been incurred had his neighbor been poor. In Rhee [2004b], we tackle this problem in detail
by comparing the immigration incentives of an agent to the communities with diﬀerent expected
endowments.
24 Note that it is assumed that an increasing tax schedule is used on Ω2.
25 As mentioned in Section 2.1, each agent’s initial endowment is considered as his taxable wealth. Thus, the 100%
tax rate is acceptable in this sense.
184.2 Comparative Statics
One of the interesting questions about the optimal feasible tax schedule is how the optimal feasible
tax schedule t∗ will respond to the change in the probability of low endowment p. We are also
interested in how t∗ will change as ωL or ωH varies. In the following, we exclude the trivial case
Ω2 in which ﬁrst best taxation is always possible.
4.2.1 Responses of t∗ to p
Since both t∗
LH and t∗
HH are independent of p, it suﬃces to analyze the responses of t∗
LL and t∗
HL.
Given (ωL,ωH) ∈ Ω1, if p ≧   ρ, then t∗ is independent of p. Thus, suppose p <   ρ. By Lemma 3.7,
we have the following subcases.
(1) ωL + ωH ≦ 1
In this case, only t∗
LL = tLL depends on p. Since the principal branch W0 of the Lambert W
function is strictly increasing, it follows that
dtLL
dp > 0, that is, t∗
LL is strictly increasing.
(2) ωL + ωH > 1
Case (i)   tLL ≧ ωL: If T ≦ 1, then only t∗
LL = to





   















     




since the nominator is negative by to
LL < 1 and the denominator is negative by   T < T ≦ 1 = To.
Hence, t∗
LL is strictly increasing. If T > 1, then only t∗
HL = T −ωL depends on p. Since   T ≦ T and
T >
2p−1















   
       
z(T,ωL;p)=0
≧ 0, (6)
which implies that t∗
HL is increasing.26
Case (ii)   tLL < ωL: In this case, we claim that 1 < T ≦   T. By Remark 3.8, T ≦   T is clear. To see






− 1 + 2ωL
 





− 1 + 2ωL
 
+ (1 − p)log   T > 0.
That is, the (IC)-curve is always above the point (1,ωL), which implies 1 < T. Thus, only t∗
HL =
T − ωL depends on p. By (6),
dT
dp < 0, so t∗
HL is strictly decreasing.
(3) Interpretation
Table 2 summarizes the responses of t∗ to p for each possible case. Figure 4 shows the examples for
some diﬀerent endowments values.27 Roughly speaking, t∗
LL is (weakly) increasing for p increases.
26 The equality holds only if   tLL = ωL.














p ≧   ρ (including ΩF) 0 0 0 0
p <   ρ ωL + ωH ≦ 1 + 0 0 0
ωL + ωH > 1   tLL ≧ ωL T ≦ 1 + 0 0 0
T > 1 0 0 + 0
  tLL < ωL 0 0 − 0
Table 2: A summary of the responses of t∗ to p.
However, t∗
HL is (weakly) increasing for relatively low ωL, but decreasing for large ωL. In fact, these
results show how the (IC) constraint will change as the probability of low endowment p increases.
Suppose ﬁrst that the initial low endowment is small enough such that   tLL ≧ ωL (the areas of
1   and 2   in Figure 2). In this case, the increase in p makes the (IC) constraint less tight for both
t∗
LL and t∗
HL in the sense that the set of incentive compatible and feasible tax schedules becomes
larger.28 Thus, the social planner can increase t∗
LL or t∗
HL as long as the feasibility constraint is
binding. That is, for T ≦ 1 (the interior solution case), t∗
LL increases but t∗
HL stays the same since
the solution always occurs at To = 1, and for T > 1 (the corner solution case), t∗
HL increases but
t∗
LL is ﬁxed at its feasible maximum ωL. The economic intuition behind this result is as follows:
The social planner has to take into account the informational rent incurred by a rich agent. When
ωL is relatively small such that   tLL ≧ ωL, the social planner can design an incentive compatible
tax mechanism without much worrying about such an informational rent because the rich agent is
reluctant to lie to avoid too small provision of public good. Thus, as p increases, the rich agent
(IC) constraint becomes less tight. (Figure 4(a)(b)(e)(f)).
On the other hand, suppose that the initial low endowment ωL is relatively large such that
  tLL < ωL (the area of 3   in Figure 2).29 In this case, the increase in p makes the (IC) constraint
less tight for t∗
LL but tighter for t∗
HL in the sense that the set of incentive compatible and feasible
tax schedules becomes larger with respect to t∗
LL, but smaller with respect to t∗
HL. Thus, the social
planner would like to decrease t∗
HL and increase t∗
LL as long as the feasibility constraint is binding.
Since in this case t∗
LL is already set at its maximum ωL (the corner solution case), only t∗
HL should
be decreased. This result can be interpreted as follows: If ωL is relatively large, then too small
public good provision is no longer a big problem. Thus, as p increases, the rich agent is more willing
to lie, which implies that the social planner should decrease the rich agent’s tax payment thl∗ to
make him honest (Figure 4(c)(d)(g)(h)).
28 Recall by Lemma 3.7 that the (IC)-curve z(T,tLL;p) = 0 turns counterclockwise around the pivotal point (  T,  tLL)
as p increases.
































































































































(h) (ωL,ωH) = (0.6,1.3)















































































































(h) ωL = 0.45, p = 0.5
Figure 5: Responses of t∗
LL and t∗








1   ρ
= 0.72




















































(f) ωL = 0.6, p = 0.5
Figure 6: Expected Total Provision of Public Good: E(y)
4.2.2 Responses of t∗ to ωL or ωH
We have already studied rough responses of t∗ to ωL or ωH by its characterization for diﬀerent cases
on Ω. Now, we provide some simulated examples for better understanding the optimal feasible tax
mechanism. Figure 5(a)–(d) show the responses of t∗ to ωL and Figure 5(e)–(h) to ωH when
p = 0.15 or 0.5.
Consider ﬁrst the responses to a change in ωL. As ωL increases, we can see that t∗
LL is increasing,
but t∗
HL is (weakly) decreasing for lower values of ωL and then increasing for larger values. These
results can be interpreted as follows. For lower ωL, a ﬁrst best solution like Figure 3(a) is possible so
that t∗
LL and t∗
HL are set their maximum. As ωL increases more, a corner solution like Figure 3(b)
could occur depending on the values of ωH and p. In this case, t∗
HL stays the same at its maximal but
tLL would be less than ωL. As ωL increases furthermore, then an interior solution like Figure 3(d)
will happen. In this case, t∗
LL will increase but t∗
HL will decrease. As ωL increases even further, a
corner solution like Figure 3(e) or (f) is obtained. In this case, t∗
HL is decreasing initially and then
23increasing, and t∗
LL is increasing with ωL. One of the interesting implications from these results is
that an increase in ωL can decrease the tax burden of a rich agent if ωL is relatively small.
We can apply a similar interpretation to the change of ωH. That is, for lower ωH, a ﬁrst best
solution like Figure 3(a) is obtained, and then a corner solution like Figure 3(b) and/or an interior
solution like Figure 3(d) is obtained depending on the values of ωL and p. Eventually, the optimal
solution ends up an interior one like Figure 3(d) or a corner solution like Figure 3(e) or (f). Notice
also that an increase in ωH can decrease the tax burden of a poor agent if ωL is relatively small
and ωH is relatively large (see Figure 3(e)).
4.2.3 Expected Total Provision of Public Good
Finally, we show how much public goods will be provided as p, ωL, or ωH varies. The expected
total provision of public good is expressed as
E(y) = p2(2t∗
LL) + 2p(1 − p)(t∗
LH + t∗
HL) + (1 − p)∗(2t∗
HH).
The Figure 6 illustrates some examples of those responses. Roughly speaking, E(y) increases as ωL
or ωH increase, and as p decreases.30 In particular, for large ωH, the increase in ωL may reduce
E(y) (Figure 6(d)). This fact reﬂects the observation that the increase of ωL may decrease t∗
HL so
much. Thus, even if t∗
LL and t∗
LH increase with ωL, the decrease of t∗
HL is still dominating, which
results in the smaller E(y).
5 Optimal Feasible Tax Mechanism for n > 2









, which is the solution to (Pn). To begin with,
consider the case of (ωL,ωH) ∈ Ω2. The social planner can easily solve (Pn) by imposing a ﬁrst
best feasible tax schedule
t∗ ∈
 
t ∈ [0,ωL]n × [0,ωH]n : tL,(n−1)L,0H = 1, tH,0L,(n−1)H = 1;
(n − k)tL,(n−1−k)L,kH + ktH,(n−k)L,(k−1)H = n, and
1 ≦ tL,(n−1−k)L,kH ≦ ωL, for k = 1,...,n − 1
 
.









If the social planner insists that the tax schedule be increasing, then the unique solution to (Pn) is
t∗ = (1,...,1;1,...,1). Therefore, in the following we just assume that (ωL,ωH) ∈ Ω1.
30 Although not provided here, the case in which ωL is quite small, say 0.05, shows the possibility that E(y) increases




HL as a small p increases (see
Figure 4(a)(b)(e) or (f)) could increase E(y).
31 See Appendix A for derivation.
245.1 Possibility of First Best Taxation
First of all, partition Ω1 into
Ω1A = {(ωL,ωH) ∈ Ω1 : ωH ≦ 1},
Ω1Bi = {(ωL,ωH) ∈ Ω1 \ Ω1A : iωL + (n − i)ωH < n ≦ (i − 1)ωL + (n − i + 1)ωH},
for i = 1,...,n. If (ωL,ωH) ∈ Ω1Bi, i = 1,...,n, the ﬁrst best feasible tax schedule is
tF ∈
 
t ∈ [0,ωL]n × [0,ωH]n : tL,(n−1)L,0H = ωL, tH,0L,(n−1)H = 1;
tL,(n−1−k)L,kH = ωL, tH,(n−k)L,(k−1)H = ωH, k = 1,...,n − i;













there is no (ωL,ωH) ∈ Ω1Bi for i = 1,...,n such that the ﬁrst best feasible tax schedule tF can
be the solution to (Pn) for every p ∈ (0,1). Also, it turns out that the polynomial equation
∆(tF;p) = 0 of p may have multiple roots so that it is impossible to deﬁne the unique ρ such that
∆(tF;p) ≧ 0 for p ≧ ρ.
Now, suppose that (ωL,ωH) ∈ Ω1A. In this case, the unique ﬁrst best feasible tax schedule is
tF = (ωL,...,ωL;ωH,...,ωH).





 n−j  
k=0
(−1)k+mod(n−1−j,2)
n−jCk log(kωL + (n − k)ωH)
 
− (ωH − ωL),
(8)
where mod(x,2) is 0 if x is even and 1 if x is odd.
Lemma 5.1 For all n ≧ 2 and all j = 0,...,n − 2, ∆(tF;p) is strictly increasing in pn−1−j.
Proof : See Appendix C.
For (ωL,ωH) ∈ Ω1A, deﬁne ρ ∈ R by ∆(tF;ρ) = 0, and let   ρ = min{1,ρ}. Deﬁne also




ωL + (n − 1)ωH
− (ωH − ωL) ≧ 0}.
Proposition 5.2 If p ≧   ρ, then the ﬁrst best feasible tax schedule tF is the unique solution to
(Pn). In particular, if (ωL,ωH) ∈ ΩF, then tF is the unique solution to (Pn) for all p ∈ (0,1).
32 To see that log
n
ωL+(n−1)ωH −(1−ωL) < 0 for (ωL,ωH) ∈ Ω21, note that d(LHS)/dωL > 0. Since ωL < n−(n−1)ωL




ωL + (n − 1)ωH
− (1 − ωL) = (n − 1)(1 − ωH) < 0.
33 See Appendix B for derivation.
25Proof : Same as the proof of Proposition 3.2.
Corollary 5.3 lim
n→∞ΩF =   .
Proof : Since limn→∞ limp→0 ∆(tF;p) = −(ωH − ωL) < 0, we have the result.
The intuition of this result is that as the number of agents increases, the incentive for a rich agent to
misreport his type increases because the possibility that too little public good is provided decreases.
Thus, it becomes more diﬃcult to satisfy the (IC) constraint and ﬁnally the possibility of ﬁrst best
feasible tax schedule gets to disappear.
5.2 Second Best Feasible Tax Schedule
The same result as Lemma 3.3 holds for n > 2.
Proposition 5.4 Suppose that a tax schedule t∗ is a solution to (Pn). Then,
t∗
H,0L,(n−1)H = min{ωH,1}.
Proof : Same as the proof of Lemma 3.3.
On the contrary, the result like Lemmas 3.5 does not hold for n > 2. Nonetheless, we can ﬁnd a
similar result with a mild assumption.
Proposition 5.5 Suppose that a tax schedule t∗ is a solution to (Pn). For each j ∈ {1,...,n−1},
if t∗
H,jL,(n−1−j)H > 0, then
t∗
L,(j−1)L,(n−j)H = ωL.
Proof : If ωL = 0, then the claim is obvious. Thus, assume that ωL > 0. Suppose by way of
contradiction that t∗
L,(j−1)L,(n−j)H < ωL. Choose ε such that
0 < ε ≦ min{ωL − t∗
L,(j−1)L,(n−j)H,t∗
H,jL,(n−1−j)H}.
Consider another tax schedule t′ which replaces t∗
L,(j−1)L,(n−j)H and t∗












respectively. Then, it follows that












which implies that ∆(t′;p) > 0. Since ∆(t;p) is continuous in tH,jL,(n−1−j)H we can choose δ ∈
(0,ε) such that a new tax schedule t′′, which replaces t′




n−j, satisﬁes (IC). Note that t′′ also satisﬁes (Feasibility) by its construction, and
that
jt′′
L,(j−1)L,(n−j)H + (n − j)t′′
H,jL,(n−1−j)H > jt∗
L,(j−1)L,(n−j)H + (n − j)t∗
H,jL,(n−1−j)H.
Thus, we have W(t′′;p) > W(t∗;p), a contradiction to the hypothesis that t∗ is a solution.
This result implies that if the tax payment of rich agents is at least positive, poor agents have to
pay 100% tax in the optimal feasible taxation scheme. Thus, the same interpretation as for the
two-agent case applies; the optimal feasible tax schedule imposes the burden caused by the rich
agents’ informational rents on poor agents as much as possible. Also, it is possible that the tax
payment of rich agents is absolutely less than that of poor agents since the optimal feasible tax
schedule may not be increasing.34 Therefore, as the number of agents increases, the regressiveness
of optimal feasible tax mechanism could be worse.
Furthermore, in addition to the above positivity assumption, if we assume that the tax schedule
must be increasing and tH,(n−1)L,0H ≧ ωL, we can show that the same result as Lemma 3.5 for
n > 2. However, even if we restrict the domain of tax mechanism by those assumptions, it is
virtually impossible to describe the optimal feasible tax schedule for n > 2 due to not only too
many corner solutions but also the high dimensionality of social planner’s problem. In the next
section, we study the case in which there is a continuum of agents in the economy.
5.3 n = ∞
Suppose that there are inﬁnitely many agents in the economy. With no loss of generality, we
normalize the set of agents as N = [0,1]. In this case, a tax schedule can be expressed by t∞ =
(tL,∞,tH,∞) where for example tL,∞ is the tax payment of agent i ∈ N when he reports ωL. Since
Pr(ωj = ωL) = p for all j ∈ N, the expected utility of agent i when his endowment is ωH is
Ui(ωH|ωH,t∞) = log
 
ptL,∞ + (1 − p)tH,∞
 
+ ωH − tH,∞
if he reports ωH, and
Ui(ωL|ωH,t∞) = log
 
ptL,∞ + (1 − p)tH,∞
 
+ ωH − tL,∞




W(t∞;p) = log(ptL,∞ + (1 − p)tH,∞) − (ptL,∞ + (1 − p)tH,∞)
subject to
(IC) tL,∞ ≧ tH,∞
(Feasibility) (tL,∞,tH,∞) ∈ [0,ωL] × [0,ωH].
For (ωL,ωH) ∈ Ω2, the optimal feasible tax schedule is
t∗
∞ ∈ {(tL,∞,tH,∞) ∈ [0,ωL] × [0,ωH] : ptL,∞ + (1 − p)tH,∞ = 1, tL,∞ ≧ tH,∞}.
34 For the three-agent case, we can show that there exists a non-increasing optimal feasible tax schedule under the
positivity assumption of rich agents’ tax payment.












This result implies that there is no way to prevent a rich agent from lying if tH,∞ is greater than
tL,∞, so that imposing ωL on every agent is optimal for n = ∞. Note that the poor agent’s tax
rate is always 100%, but the rich agent’s is strictly less than 100%.
6 Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we consider the feasible taxation problem of a public good economy from an eﬃciency
point of view. Using a Bayesian mechanism design approach, we fully characterized the optimal
feasible tax mechanism for an economy with two agents, and conducted some comparative statics
analyses of the mechanism. Also, we provided some partial characterization results for the case of
more than two agents. These characterization results show how the optimal tax mechanism deals
with the incentive or free-riding problem of the economy and the (individual) feasibility constraint
simultaneously. In the following, we will discuss some extensions of this study.
In this paper, we assumed that the social welfare is the sum of the agents’ utilities. However, if
we assume another form of social welfare functions such as weighted sum of the agents’ utilities or
Rawlsian welfare function, then ﬁnding an optimal feasible tax mechanism would be a quite diﬃcult
problem because we are no longer able to reduce the dimension of the social planner’s problem. By
nature, the feasibility constraint renders the optimal tax mechanism to have many corner solutions
so that the high dimensionality of the problem will produce so many cases we have to handle.
Our optimal feasible tax mechanism is not renegotiation-proof. Consider for example of Fig-
ure 3(d). If two agents are both poor, then each one’s tax payment is t∗
LL ≈ 0.21 < 0.25 = ωL.
Thus, after the optimal taxation, they have an ex-post incentive to renegotiate for increasing the
underprovided public good since the marginal beneﬁt from the increase in public good is greater
than the marginal cost, −1. In this case, we can easily make our optimal feasible tax mechanism
renegotiation-proof by imposing a constraint that t∗
LL = ωL if ωL ≦ 1/2 and t∗
LL > 1/2 if ωL > 1/2.
Note that this renegotiation-proofness decreases t∗
HL for some cases.
Finally, we may consider the model with more than two types. If a continuous type space is
employed for each agent, we have to deal with the (IC) constraint which has a form of partial diﬀer-
ential equation or inequality. Unfortunately, the standard diﬀerential approach used in mechanism
design literature (e.g., Laﬀont and Maskin [1979]) is not applicable to this case. Thus, it is an open
question in the future research how to transform such a partial diﬀerential equation suitable to the
social planner’s objective function.
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n−1Cjpj(1 − p)n−1−j log
  jωL + (n − j)ωH
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 n−j  
k=0
(−1)k+mod(n−1−j,2)
n−jCk log(kωL + (n − k)ωH)
 
− (ωH − ωL),
To see that the third equality holds, consider the coeﬃcient of pn−1−j, j = 0,...,n−1. Suppose (n−1−j)
is even. Then, the coeﬃcient is
 
n−1C0   n−1Cn−1−j
  




n−1C1   n−2Cn−2−j
  




n−1C2   n−3Cn−3−j
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n−1Ck−1   n−kCj + n−1Ck   n−k−1Cj
 
log(kωL + (n − k)ωH)
=
 




n−1Cj   jC0
 






n−1Cj   n−jCk
 





n−jCk log(kωL + (n − k)ωH).
31A similar calculation shows that when (n − 1 − j) is odd the coeﬃcient is the same.
C Proof of Lemma 5.1
Proof : Let ξn,j(ωL,ωH) =
 n−j
k=0(−1)k+mod(n−1−j,2)
n−jCk log(kωL + (n − k)ωH). First, we want to show
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k=0
(−1)k+mod(n−1−j,2)





(−1)k+mod(n−1−j,2) (n − k)n−jCk
kωL + (n − k)ωH








k=1(kωL + (n − k)ωH)
 




k=0(kωL + (n − k)ωH)
 
> 0.
Thus, we have for all n ≧ 2 and all j = 0,...,n − 2,





by the Binomial Theorem. It follows that
∂∆(tF;p)
∂pn−1−j = n−1Cjξn,j(ωL,ωH) > 0.
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